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THE PUBLICITY OF THOUGHT
By Andrea Onofri
An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thoughts,
and the same applies to a single subject at different times. This ‘publicity principle’ has recently come
under attack. Arguments byMark Crimmins, Richard Heck and Brian Loar seem to show that publicity
is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle that someone who is ignorant or mistaken about certain
identity facts will have distinct thoughts about the relevant object—for instance, the astronomer who
does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus will have two distinct thoughts Hesperus is bright
and Phosphorus is bright. In this paper, I argue that publicity can be defended if we adopt a
relational account on which thoughts are individuated by their mutual relations. I then go on to develop
a specific relational theory—the ‘linking account’—and contrast it with other relational views.
Keywords: Publicity, Fregean Constraint, Frege cases, thought individuation, com-
munication, memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that thoughts are public and shareable has played a crucial role in
recent philosophy of mind and language. Frege famously held that different
thinkers can grasp the same thought: a Fregean sense ‘[...]maywell be common
property of many and is therefore not a part or mode of the single person’s
mind: for it cannot well be denied that mankind possesses a common treasure
of thoughts which is transmitted from generation to generation.’ (Frege 1892:
188)1 An influential tradition followed Frege in holding that ordinary thinkers
‘can and do’ (Fodor 1998: 28) share many of their thoughts. However, this
‘publicity principle’ has recently come under attack. One reason for this is
that publicity is notoriously in tension2 with another influential Fregean idea,
the idea that someone who is mistaken or ignorant about certain identity facts
1 See also Frege (1918). Frege’s views about publicity raise difficult exegetical questions that
cannot be addressed here. See, for instance, Frege’s (1918) remarks on first-person thoughts.
2 See Crimmins (1992: 35–53), Heck (2002), Loar (1988), Cumming (2013: especially p. 15),
Aydede (1998; 2000a,b), Laurence and Margolis (2007), Schneider (2011) and Duhau (2012).
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2 ANDREA ONOFRI
must have distinct thoughts about the relevant object. Suppose someone is
in a so-called Frege case—for instance, consider an astronomer who does not
know that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ corefer. According to most authors,
the thought she expresses with ‘Hesperus is bright’ must be distinct from the
thought she expresses with ‘Phosphorus is bright’.
To seewhy Frege cases generate a tensionwith publicity, note that a theory of
thought should provide an individuation criterion (or identity criterion) for thoughts,
i.e., a set of identity conditions of the following form:
Individuation criterion: A thought ta is the same thought as a thought tb iff ...
Now, publicity pushes us to individuate thoughts coarsely. Our individuation
criterion must not be too strict, or it will count any two subjects as having
different thoughts.On the contrary, Frege cases push us to individuate thoughts
finely. Our individuation criterion must not be too loose, or it will count the
astronomer’s thoughts as the same.
Let us give one example to see why the tension arises. Suppose we adopt an
holistic individuation criterion on which two thoughts are the same only if they
have exactly the same inferential connections3—where, roughly, a thought ta
is inferentially connected to a thought tb just in case the thinker is disposed
to infer tb from ta or ta from tb. Now, the thought the astronomer expresses
with ‘Hesperus is bright’ will be inferentially connected to the thought the
brightest heavenly body which appears in the evening is bright.4 On the
contrary, the thought the astronomer expresses with ‘Phosphorus is bright’ will
not have this inferential connection. So the holistic criterion correctly predicts
that in our Frege case the astronomer’s thoughts are distinct. Unfortunately,
however, the criterion clearly violates publicity—as holists themselves recog-
nise. My thought Hesperus is bright is inferentially connected to many other
thoughts—thoughts about other heavenly bodies, about the Solar System, and
so on. So, according to an holistic criterion, my thought is the same as yours
only if my beliefs about these matters (heavenly bodies, the Solar System ...)
are exactly the same as yours. Since this is very unlikely, the holist holds that
two subjects almost never have the same thoughts.
Can any criterion for thought identity account for Frege cases and publicity
at the same time? Arguments by Mark Crimmins, Richard Heck and Brian
Loar suggest a negative answer—to account for Frege cases we must reject
the publicity of thought.5 This paper has two main aims. My first aim is
to defend publicity. Having examined the arguments based on Crimmins’,
Heck’s and Loar’s considerations, I will identify their common structure and
3 See for instance Block (1993) and Schneider (2011).
4 Following standard usage, I refer to thoughts and their constituents by using expressions in
small capitals.
5 Duhau (2012) rejects publicity for the same reason.
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THE PUBLICITY OF THOUGHT 3
propose a unified response—the arguments fail to refute publicity if we assume
a relational model,6 i.e., a model that individuates thoughts in terms of their
mutual relations. This will be my focus in Sections IV–VII. In Section VIII, I
will move to my second goal, sketching a specific relational account that differs
from the other relational proposals currently on the market. Sections II and
III will set up the background for our discussion.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to answer the arguments based on
Crimmins, Heck and Loar through a unified relational response and to defend
the specific relational account I favour. At the same time, as I will later explain
in more detail, my arguments are much indebted to the previous literature on
the topic, particularly to other defenders of the relational model:7 Campbell
(1987), Sainsbury (2002), Millikan (1997; 2000), Cumming (2013), Dickie and
Rattan (2010), Schroeter (2012) and Prosser (unpublished manuscript).8 My
aim is to contribute to this emerging picture of thought individuation.
II. PUBLICITY, COMMUNICATION ANDMEMORY
Following standard usage,9 let a thought be a representation of a state of affairs to
which a subject can bear various propositional attitude relations. For instance,
the thought Hume wrote ‘A Treatise ofHumanNature’ represents the state
of affairs Hume’s having written ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’.10 A subject can just
entertain that thought, in which case she will represent the corresponding state
6 The label ‘relational’ is from Cumming (2013: 15) and Schroeter (2012).
7 I am especially indebted to Dickie and Rattan (2010), Schroeter (2012), Schroeter and
Schroeter (2014), Cumming (2013) and Prosser (unpublished manuscript), even though my rela-
tional view is different from each of these illuminating proposals.
Dickie and Rattan use their relational account to respond to Heck. However, my response
to Heck is partly different. Furthermore, they do not discuss Crimmins and Loar at all.
Schroeter’s (2012) Flexibility principle is related to publicity, but her argument for the
relational model is different from mine. Schroeter and Schroeter (2014) also develop Schroeter’s
relational account.
I am indebted to Clarke (unpublished manuscript) for mentioning Schroeter’s view in dis-
cussing the tension between publicity and Frege cases. In general, I was significantly influenced
by Clarke’s insightful arguments.
Cumming (2013) discusses cases that have important elements in common with the cases
I analyse. He acknowledges the tension between publicity and Frege cases (p. 2) and aims at
resolving that tension (p. 14). However, he does not analyse or respond to the arguments by
Crimmins, Heck and Loar [he only briefly mentions Crimmins (1992)]. Therefore, he also does
not show how his account can respond to those arguments.
Prosser (unpublished manuscript) offers a relational account similar to Schroeter and Dickie
and Rattan but does not discuss the Crimmins, Heck and Loar arguments.
8 Fine (2007) was another source of influence: his relationist account presents both similarities
and differences with the relational model. I was also influenced by Perry (1980), Recanati (2012)
and Heck (2012)—their views have important elements in common with the relational picture.
9 See Edwards (2014).
10 See Textor (2016).
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of affairs without taking the thought to be true or false. If she also believes
the thought to be true (or false), then she will accept (or reject) the thought in
addition to entertaining it.
Let us now introduce publicity and its motivations. Several arguments for
publicity have been offered, but my focus will be on arguments based on com-
munication. Publicity is supported by what Heck calls the ‘natural’ conception
of communication:11
[...] when you grasp the content of my assertion, you thereby grasp the very Thought I
believe and am trying to communicate to you. [...] when I communicate, I am trying to
bring it about that someone else should come (to have the opportunity) to share a belief
with me [...]. (Heck 2002: 6)
Communication pushes us to adopt an interpersonal version of publicity. But
we also have powerful reasons to endorse an intrapersonal diachronic version
of the principle: a single subject can and often does entertain the same thought
at different times. First, communication can also occur between different time
slices of the same subject. Secondly, considerations about memory support
an intrapersonal diachronic version of publicity: if I form a belief at time t1,
I can retain it and hold the same belief at time t2 as long as my memory is
functioning properly.12
The above considerations give us reason to accept the following principle:
Publicity: If different subjects (or different time slices of the same subject) communi-
cate successfully, then they can entertain the same thought. Furthermore, if a subject
entertains a thought at time t1, she can entertain the same thought at a later time t2 if
her memory is successful on that occasion.
Admittedly, this formulation is not sufficiently precise. For instance, we are not
told exactly what thoughts must be shared by the relevant subjects. Unfortu-
nately, defenders of Publicity have not provided a more rigorous version of the
principle. I will therefore rely on the above formulation; this will be enough
for my purposes, and the discussion to follow will help to clarify what version
of Publicity is relevant in this context.
There are two issues on which I will remain neutral. The first issue concerns
the structure of thought. According to some views, a thought is a structured
entity constituted by concepts—the thought Hume wrote the Treatise is a
complex representation which has the concept Hume among its constituents.13
According to other views, a thought does not have structure. For instance,
11 As we will see, Heck rejects this conception, but it is endorsed by several others including
Prinz (2002: 14), Schroeter (2012), Cumming (2013) and Dickie and Rattan (2010).
12 For others who subscribe to a form of diachronic publicity, see Rey (2011), Dickie and
Rattan (2010) and Perry (1980).
13 See Fodor (1998; 2008), Laurence and Margolis (1999) and Prinz (2002).
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THE PUBLICITY OF THOUGHT 5
some authors model the content of thought as a set of possible worlds.14 My
arguments are compatible with these disparate views, and thus need not rely
on any contentious premises concerning the structure of thought.
The other issue on which I will remain neutral concerns the ontology of
thought.15 According to some views, a thought is a mental representation;16
for instance, a complex representation constituted by symbols in the Lan-
guage of Thought17 or by mental files.18 Theorists from this tradition ap-
peal to a type–token distinction if they desire to account for Publicity.19 Two
word tokens can be numerically distinct (they have different physical prop-
erties) but type-identical (they are tokens of the same word type). Similarly,
my thought token can be numerically distinct from your thought token—they
might have different physical properties, different inferential connections and
so on. Still, you and I can have the same thought in the sense of having nu-
merically distinct thought tokens of the same type. According to other views, a
thought is not a mental representation but an abstract proposition.20 Theorists
from this tradition construe Publicity differently: you and I have numerically
distinct mental representations, but these representations express numerically
identical abstract thoughts, i.e., they express the very same thought.
Other ontological views are certainly possible.21 To remain neutral on
the issue without making the discussion too complex, I will simplify some
details. In particular, I will often say, ‘Thought t has such-and-such inferential
connections ...’. If thoughts are abstract, this should be interpreted as ‘The
mental representation expressing t has such-and-such inferential connections
...’. I will also sometimes say, ‘Thoughts t1/t222 are the same thought even
though they have different inferential connections ...’. Again, if thoughts are
abstract this should be interpreted as ‘Thoughts t1/t2 are the same thought even
though the mental representations expressing them have different inferential
connections ...’.
III. THE FREGEAN CONSTRAINT
As we have seen, Publicity is in tension with another plausible principle that
Frege also seemed to endorse.23 Consider subjects in Frege cases, who are
14 See, for instance, Stalnaker (1984).
15 For discussion, see Laurence and Margolis (1999; 2007).
16 See Laurence and Margolis (2007) and Fodor (1998).
17 See Fodor (1998).
18 See Recanati (2012).
19 See Laurence and Margolis (1999; 2007), Fodor (1998) and Aydede (2000a).
20 See Frege (1918), Peacocke (1992) and Rey (1994).
21 See Crimmins (1992: chs. 2–3).
22 I will often use ‘/’ for ‘and’.
23 See the ‘Intuitive Criterion of Difference’ that Evans (1982: 18–9) ascribes to Frege.
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ignorant or mistaken about certain identity facts.24 Familiar considerations
concerning these subjects’ rationality25 and behaviour26 have led many to
endorse various versions of the following principle:27
The Fregean Constraint (FC): If a subject can rationally believe of x, thought of
under thought ta, that it is F, and at the same time believe of x, thought of under thought
tb, that it is not F, then ta and tb are different thoughts
Consider for instance the astronomer who does not know that Hesperus is
Phosphorus. She can think of Venus under the thought Hesperus is bright or
the thought Phosphorus is bright—that is, she can think of Venus in virtue of
entertaining one of these two thoughts. She could rationally believe of Venus
that it is bright when thinking of it under the first thought, and at the same
time believe of Venus that it is not bright when thinking of it under the second
thought. By FC, it would then follow that these are different thoughts.
In Section I, I noted that it is not easy to satisfy both Publicity and FC at
the same time. This suggests a disquieting hypothesis: perhaps the two princi-
ples are simply inconsistent and Publicity should be rejected. In the following
sections, I examine various arguments in favour of rejecting Publicity.28 These
arguments are significantly different and deserve separate treatments. How-
ever, they employ the same strategy—each of them claims that Publicity and
FC have inconsistent consequences in certain cases and that Publicity should
therefore be abandoned. I will argue that these arguments all fail for the same
reason: if we assume a relational individuation criterion for thoughts, Publicity
and FC are perfectly compatible in the cases under examination.29
IV. CRIMMINS’ ARGUMENT
Crimmins (1992) explicitly denies Publicity: ‘[...] an adequate account of be-
lief should [...] explain belief in terms of agent-bound, unshareable concrete
24 See Frege (1892) and Kripke (1979).
25 See Recanati (2012: 221) and Schiffer (1990: 252).
26 See Fodor (2008: 64 and 86, 1998: 39) and Prinz (2002: 15–6).
27 This formulation is based onRecanati (2012: 221) andSchiffer (1990: 252), withmodifications
to make it compatible with unstructured theories of thought; see Section II.
28 See Crimmins (1992: 35–53), Heck (2002) and Loar (1988).
29 I was greatly inspired by Prosser (unpublished manuscript), who argues that there is no
special problem concerning interpersonal and diachronic thought identity: the problems that
arise for thoughts parallel those that arise in other areas, e.g. in the personal identity literature.
My arguments were also substantially influenced by Dickie and Rattan (2010) and Cumming
(2013): Dickie and Rattan offer a relational account in their response to Heck, while Cumming
briefly mentions Crimmins’ argument and holds that his own relational account can resolve the
tension between Publicity and FC.
The following sections are also a response to my own argument in Onofri (2016), where I
argued that Publicity and FC are inconsistent.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pq/pqx062/4762114
by guest
on 17 January 2018
THE PUBLICITY OF THOUGHT 7
cognitive particulars.’ (Crimmins 1992: 35) Crimmins’ argument starts with a
discussion of Perry’s Hume–Heimson case: ‘Hume sincerely utters, “I wrote
the Treatise.” The madman Heimson sincerely utters the same sentence, “I
wrote the Treatise.”’ (ibid.: 39) Now, Perry thinks that ‘Hume and Heimson
believe different propositions in virtue of being in the same cognitive belief state.’
(ibid.: 40) In response, Crimmins constructs the following variant of the case:
As before, Heimson knows that Hume’s masterpiece is a book called ‘the Treatise’, and
he takes this to be his own book. But Heimson also has heard of an unpopular book
promoting the worst kind of skepticism, called ‘A Treatise on Human Nature’, and has heard
this book, too, referred to as ‘the Treatise’. He does not realize that the “two” books are
really identical [...]. (ibid.: 45)
Then Crimmins argues:
[...] we have concocted a case in which, for Heimson, there are two possible instances of
believing that might underlie his saying ‘I wrote the Treatise’. And it is easy to imagine
the “two-belief ” case (Heimson believes that he wrote “both” Treatises), in which both
instances of believing are real. We must suppose that these co-possible instances of
believing are classified by different belief states, if belief states are to do the individuative
job they are meant for. If so, just which of these belief states is the one that Heimson
shares with Hume? In setting up the original case for identifying Hume’s and Heimson’s
belief states, it now seems, we were too quick; we specified nothing about Heimson’s
belief that could not be true of two different instances of Heimson’s believing that he
wrote the Treatise. We have no basis on which to identify either of Heimson’s belief states
with Hume’s belief state, since there is nothing we know that decides between the two.
[...] Whatever basis we have to identify Hume and Heimson’s belief states in the original
example, we also have to identify Heimson’s two belief states in the modified example (in
which Heimson believes himself to have written two Treatises). [...] there was nothing we
provided in the original example as a basis for identifying Hume’s and Heimson’s states
that is not equally a basis in the two-belief example for identifying two of Heimson’s
states. (ibid.: 46–7)
Note that Crimmins’ case involves two cases of identity confusion—Heimson’s
mistake about his own identity and his mistake about there being two books
called ‘the Treatise’. It is only the second mistake that is relevant for Crimmins’
purposes. I will therefore modify the case and use the proper name ‘Hume’
in formulating Hume and Heimson’s utterances. I hope this helps the reader
focus on the only identity mistake that is relevant here, i.e., Heimson’s mistake
about the identity of the book.
We can now proceed to analyse Crimmins’ argument, which is not com-
pletely clear but seems to go as follows. First Crimmins asks us to suppose:
(a) Hume asserts ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’ and believes the book to be a
masterpiece. Let b∗ be the belief expressed by his utterance.
(b) Heimson asserts ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’ and believes the book to be an
unpopular sceptical work. Let b1 be the belief expressed by his utterance.
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(c) (In a different context) Heimson asserts ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’ and
believes the book to be a masterpiece. Let b2 be the belief expressed by his
utterance.
Then Crimmins argues:
(1) If b1 = b∗,30 then there is a basis to identify b1 and b∗.
(2) If there is a basis to identify b1 and b∗, then, by the same basis, b1 = b2.
(3) But b1 = b2.
(4) So b1 = b∗.
(5) If Publicity is true, then b1 = b∗.
Conclusion: Publicity is false.
Clearly, the argument exploits the Publicity–FC tension, for FC is what moti-
vates premise (3). Why are Heimson’s beliefs distinct? Roughly, because they
involve different thoughts—and these thoughts are distinct because Heimson
could rationally accept the first and reject the second, due to hismisconception.
Does the argument show that Publicity is false?31 To see why it does not,
note first that the case must be described so that Hume and Heimson can
communicate successfully.32 If they cannot communicate, then it does not
follow from Publicity that Heimson’s b1 = Hume’s b∗, in which case premise
(5) of Crimmins’ argument is false. So let us describe a case in which Hume
and Heimson communicate. Suppose Hume says to Heimson, ‘Hume wrote
the Treatise’. Heimson must now figure out ‘which’ Treatise is under discussion.
Suppose he reasons, ‘The book in my interlocutor’s hand is the unpopular
sceptical work. So that must be the book he is talking about’. As a result,
Heimson accepts what his interlocutor said and asserts: ‘Hume wrote the
Treatise’.
Now, if you think that Hume and Heimson are not communicating success-
fully in this case, then Publicity does not apply and premise (5) of Crimmins’
argument is false. However, I grant that this is a case of successful commu-
nication, so Publicity does require that the belief Heimson expresses (b1) and
the belief Hume expresses (b∗) are the same. But if we grant that Hume
and Heimson are communicating, then premise (2) of Crimmins’ argument is
false: there is a basis, that is, an individuation criterion, such that, on that basis,
b1 = b∗ but b1 = b2. In other words, it is not true that ‘Whatever basis we have
to identify Hume and Heimson’s belief states [...], we also have to identify
30 I will often use ‘=’/‘=’ for ‘is the same thought as’/‘is a different thought from’.
31 Crimmins’ argument shows at most that belief states are not shared. However, Crimmins
seems to think that sameness of belief requires sameness of belief state (see ibid.: 35), which I am
happy to grant. Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify this.
32 I owe this particular point to Clarke (unpublished manuscript); I am also indebted to
an anonymous reviewer and to Dickie and Rattan (2010). I was also influenced by Clarke in
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Heimson’s two belief states [...].’ (ibid.: 47) To see why, consider the relations
between the three beliefs. It is easy to see that b1/b∗ are related in a way in
which b1/b2 and b2/b∗ are not.
At this point, the reader will demand an analysis of the relations between the
three beliefs. Before I offer such an analysis, a caveat. You do not have to agree
with my analysis to accept my reply to Crimmins. One might agree that b1/b∗
stand in a certain relation R, while b1/b2 and b2/b∗ do not, but disagree with
my analysis of R. Premise (2) would still be false, for there would still be a basis
to identify b1/b∗ while distinguishing b1/b2.33 That said, the natural hypothesis
is that b1/b∗ are linked, while b1/b2 and b2/b∗ are not, where linking is defined
as follows: two thoughts are linked just in case their thinkers know that the
thoughts corefer.34 In the case just described, Heimson knows that he and his
interlocutor refer to the same book. His knowledge is based on certain features
of the context—Hume is clearly holding the book in his hand, Heimson
knows that his interlocutor has certain standard communicative intentions,
etc...Conversely, Hume also knows that he is coreferring with Heimson. So
b1/b∗ are linked.On the contrary, b1/b2 are not linked. By hypothesis,Heimson
does not believe (and therefore does not know) that his beliefs are about the
same book. Similarly, b2/b∗ are not linked. Imagine Heimson in a different
context, asserting ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’ and intending to express b2. By
hypothesis, he takes this belief to be about the other purported book, not the
one that Hume was talking about in the earlier context. So Heimson does not
know that the belief he is currently expressing and Hume’s belief corefer: the
beliefs are unlinked.
My response to Crimmins, then, is that b1/b∗ are the same because they
are linked, while b1/b2 and b2/b∗ are different because unlinked. So there is
a basis to identify b1/b∗ but not b1/b2—premise (2) of Crimmins’ argument
is false. Notice that these linking patterns hold despite certain facts about the
inferential connections of the three beliefs. By hypothesis, Heimson’s b2 shares
certain inferential connections with Hume’s b∗. For instance, both beliefs are
inferentially connected to Hume wrote a masterpiece, while b1 is not. So why
hold that b1 = b∗, while b2 = b∗? My response will not appeal to intuitions
about the identity of these thoughts. I will instead note that, by individuating
thoughts through linking relations, we can preserve both Publicity and FC.
Since these two principles are independently plausible, this gives us strong rea-
son to adopt the linking criterion. On the contrary, a criterion requiring total
or even partial overlap in inferential connections would presumably violate
33 Here I was influenced by Perry (1980: 86).
34 Here I take Recanati’s (2012) intrapersonal notion of linking and extend it to the inter-
personal and diachronic levels. The notion is related to, but distinct from, Schroeter’s (2012)
connectedness, Cumming’s coordination (2013) and Heck’s (2002) and Dickie and Rattan’s (2010) ra-
tional engagement. I will contrast my proposal with these alternatives in Section VIII. In appealing
to linking I am indebted to all these authors and to Prosser (unpublished manuscript).
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Publicity—b1/b∗ have considerably different inferential connections, and in
fact their connections might be less similar than those of b2/b∗.35 Indeed, it
seems that Crimmins is implicitly assuming such a criterion, making it unsur-
prising that he sees the tension between Publicity and FC as insurmountable.36
V. HECK’S ARGUMENT
Heck explicitly rejects Publicity:
Suppose someone says, “That bottle is half-empty.” Must I think of the bottle in the
very same way that she does if I am to understand her? I think not. If I can perceive
the bottle - if I can think of it demonstratively - I may well be in a position to know
which bottle is in question: I may know that she is demonstrating that bottle and so
know that her utterance is true if, and only if, that bottle is half-empty. If so, I will
understand her utterance: I will know its truth-condition. But my perspective on the
bottle may be sufficiently different from hers that my Thought is, by the usual Fregean
criterion, different from the one the speaker was expressing. Someone could believe that
that bottle is half-empty when she thinks about it in a demonstrative way appropriate to
perceiving it from one side, while denying that it is half-empty (or being agnostic about
the matter) when she thinks of it in a demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving it
from the other side: she might well fail to realize that the same bottle is in question both
times. (Heck 2002: 21; quoted by Dickie and Rattan 2010: 136)
Again, it is not entirely clear how the argument goes, but Heck seems to
be arguing as follows. Consider two subjects, Al and Rose, who are jointly
attending to a bottle:37
(a) Rose utters ‘That bottle is half-empty’ while looking at the bottle from
perspective p∗. Let t∗ be the thought expressed by her utterance.
(b) Al assents to Rose’s utterance while looking at the bottle from a different
perspective p1. Let t1 be the thought he entertains as a consequence of
Rose’s utterance.
(c) Al utters ‘That bottle is not half-empty’ while looking at the bottle from
perspective p∗ (the perspective Rose was occupying).38 Let t2 be the thought
expressed by his utterance.
Then Heck would argue:
35 Inferential role theories are defended by various authors—see for instance Block (1993),
Schneider (2011) and Peacocke (1992). Here, I cannot discuss whether these accounts are com-
patible with mine.
36 Crimmins also provides a further argument against Publicity (ibid.: 47–53), but this argument
presupposes the one I discussed in the text.
37 This is one of the ways in which Dickie and Rattan (2010: 138) construe Heck’s case. I will
stick to this construal, since it seems to be what Heck has in mind.
38 It does not matter whether Al moves to p∗ after hearing Rose, or simply has the disposition
to say ‘That bottle is not half-empty’ if he moved to p∗; I will leave this unspecified.
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(1) Al believes that the bottle is half-empty when looking at it from p1, while
believing that it is not half-empty when looking at it from p∗.
(2) So t1 = t2.
(3) t2 and t∗ are formed from the same perspective.
(4) So t2 = t∗.
(5) So t1 = t∗ (by the transitivity of identity).
(6) If Publicity is true, then t1 = t∗.
Conclusion: Publicity is false.
Like Crimmins, Heck exploits the Publicity–FC tension, since he explicitly
appeals to FC in defending premise (2). The two arguments also fail for parallel
reasons. I will argue that t1/t∗ are related in a way in which t1/t2 and t2/t∗ are
not. Therefore, an individuation criterion based on the relation in question
will count t2/t∗ as distinct. So premise (4) of Heck’s argument is false.
I will now put forward a hypothesis about the nature of the relevant relation,
but before I do that it is important to keep in mind that other analyses are
possible; again, one can agree with my response to Heck while disagreeing
with the specific account I propose. That said, it is natural to hypothesise that
t1/t∗ are linked, while t1/t2 and t2/t∗ are not.39 As Dickie and Rattan (2010)
would say, Al and Rose are jointly attending to the bottle, so they know that
they refer to the same object. Therefore, their thoughts t1/t∗ are linked. On
the contrary, Al does not know that the thoughts he formed at p1 and p∗ (i.e.,
t1/t2) corefer: he thinks they are about different objects. So these thoughts are
unlinked. For the same reason, t2/t∗ are also unlinked.WhenAl occupies p∗, he
reasons, ‘My current thought t2 and my previous thought t1 are about different
objects. But t1 coreferred with Rose’s thought t∗. So t2/t∗ do not corefer.’
Given these relations, then, an individuation criterion based on linking
predicts that t1/t∗ are the same because linked (this satisfies Publicity), while
t1/t2 and t2/t∗ are different because unlinked (this satisfies FC). So, assuming
the linking criterion, premise (4) of Heck’s argument is false and Publicity is
compatible with FC. As with Crimmins, it is easy to see why Heck’s argument
fails. Heck seems to implicitly assume that thoughts are individuated by the
associated visual perspectives, and on this individuation criterion Publicity and
FC are indeed incompatible; not so on a linking criterion. But why prefer the
latter option? Again, the linking criterion should be preferred not because of
intuitions about thought identity, but because it allows us to preserve both
Publicity and FC, while Heck’s account does not.40
39 See Section IV for a definition of linking.
40 Heck (2002: 20–1) also provides a partly similar argument against the publicity of first-
person thoughts. My response would be similar to the one just given, but I cannot develop it here
for reasons of space.
In footnote 57, Heck (2002) briefly mentions the possible view that, when speaker and hearer
know that they corefer, they ‘really are thinking of the object in the same way, so that the identity
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VI. LOAR’S ARGUMENT
Loar (1988) attributes to Burge41 the thesis that ‘sameness of conceptual role is
not necessary for sameness of psychological content.’ (Loar 1988: 181) According
to Loar, Burge’s argument for this claim goes as follows:
Suppose that a person who is otherwise a normal English speaker believes that he has
arthritis in his thigh, and that he also has many true beliefs about arthritis, for example,
that he has it in his wrists and ankles. When a doctor tells him that arthritis cannot
occur in the thigh [...] he is surprised but takes the doctor’s word for it. Now consider
that earlier belief which he would have expressed as “I have arthritis in my ankles.” On
the conceptual role theory, that belief should count as distinct from the doctor’s belief
that his patient has arthritis in his ankles. For the two have, or had, crucially different
ideas about what “arthritis” means, and consequently the two beliefs have [...] crucially
different conceptual links to other beliefs. But, as Burge argues, common sense ascribes
the same belief to both: the belief that the patient has arthritis in his ankles. (ibid.: 181)
Loar then imagines the following case:
Suppose that when Paul leaves home he lives in France for a while, learns about a
rheumatoid ailment called “arthrite”, and comes to believe that he has it both in his
thigh and in his ankles. He would be surprised to learn that you can’t have “arthrite”
in your thigh. As it happens Paul has a perfectly good understanding of the English
“arthritis”, which he does not realize is renderable in French as “arthrite” (perhaps he
never sees them written down). He is unfortunately given to hypochondria, and comes
to believe he has two problems with his ankles, in his words “arthrite” and “arthritis.”
(ibid.: 185)
Loar then notes that Paul seems to have two distinct beliefs: the belief he would
express with the French ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’ and the belief
he would express with the English ‘Paul has arhtritis in his ankles’.
Clearly, this case can also be used to argue against Publicity.42 Suppose Paul
says to a bilingual doctor, ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’ and the doctor
confirms, ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’. Now consider the following
thoughts:
conditions of modes of presentation are themselves sensitive to context.’ He then adds: ‘Some
of my own remarks in [Heck (1995)] could be taken similarly. But I no longer find this view
attractive, substantively speaking, for reasons I shall not discuss now.’ Here, Heck might have
something similar to my view in mind. On the other hand, it is not part of my theory that the
identity conditions of modes of presentation are sensitive to context (see Section VIII).
41 See especially Burge (1979).
42 Loar does not argue directly against Publicity, but it is clear that he would reject it.
For instance, he says, ‘But commonsense psychological explanation [...] individuates attitudes
according to their conceptual roles [...]’ (ibid.: 188). Given what Loar means by ‘conceptual
role’, this way of individuating attitudes is incompatible with Publicity. As we have seen, two
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(a) The thought Paul expresses by ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’. Call
this thought t1.
(b) The thought Paul expresses by ‘Paul has arthritis in his ankles’. Call this
thought t2.
(c) The thought the doctor expresses by ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’
or by ‘Paul has arthritis in his ankles’. Call this thought t∗.
Now, the respective inferential connections of t2/t∗ seem much more simi-
lar than the inferential connections of t1/t∗. By hypothesis, t2 is inferentially
connected to a correct conception of arthritis, and this is also the doctor’s
conception; on the contrary, t1 is inferentially connected to an incorrect con-
ception. The argument could then proceed as follows:
(1) t1 = t2.
(2) So only one of t1/t2 = t∗ (by the transitivity of identity).
(3) The inferential connections of t2/t∗ are much more similar than the infer-
ential connections of t1/t∗.
(4) So t2 = t∗, while t1 = t∗.
(5) If Publicity is true, then t1 = t∗.
Conclusion: Publicity is false.
The problem is thus the following. By FC, we can only choose one candidate
for identity with t∗. Because of its inferential role, t2 is the better candidate.
Therefore, t1 = t∗. But t1/t∗ are the thoughts involved in the communicative
exchange between Paul and the doctor, so Publicity requires their identity.
Therefore, Publicity is false.
This argument also exploits the Publicity–FC tension. My response will be
brief, since it will parallel the one given against Crimmins and Heck. The
argument overlooks the relations between the three thoughts: t1/t∗ are linked,
while t2/t∗ and t2/t1 are not. Therefore, t1 is the same as t∗, while t2 is different
from both t1/t∗. So premise (4) of the above argument is false.
Let us see why t1/t∗ are linked, while the members of the other two pairs are
not. By hypothesis, Paul and the doctor intend to refer to the same disease in
their exchange. Paul defers to the doctor on what counts as arthritis. Therefore,
he knows that the referent of his own ‘arhtrite’ is the referent of the doctor’s
‘arthrite’, whatever properties the disease in question may have. In turn, the
doctor knows that Paul is deferring to him, and this deference mechanism
guarantees that his own ‘arthrite’ corefers with Paul’s.
These connections are absent in the other two pairs. By hypothesis, Paul
takes his own ‘arhtrite’ and ‘arthritis’ to be non-coreferential. Therefore, his
utterances containing these terms express unlinked thoughts. For the same
reason, linking is also absent between t2/t∗. Paul takes his own utterance ‘Paul
has arthritis in his ankles’ and the doctor’s ‘Paul a de l’arthrite dans les chevilles’
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to be about different ailments, i.e., the ‘two different ailments’ he allegedly has
in his ankles.
Since t1/t∗ are linked and the members of the other pairs are not, t1 = t∗,
while t2 = t1/t∗. Note that, as in the previous cases, linking overrides factors
like inferential similarity. The conceptions of arthritis associated with t2/t∗
are indeed in some respects more similar than those associated with t1/t∗.
By hypothesis, t2/t∗ are associated with the correct conception, while t1 is
not. However, individuating thoughts by their inferential connections would
violate Publicity, while individuating them by their linking relations allows us
to preserve both Publicity and FC. Other things being equal, this is a great
advantage for the linking account.
VII. BELIEF RETENTION
It would be easy to apply the arguments by Crimmins, Heck and Loar to the
intrapersonal diachronic level. The target would now be the second clause
of the Publicity principle, the idea that, if a subject entertains a thought at a
certain time, she can entertain the same thought at a later time if her memory
is successful on that occasion. Here is how the attack against Publicity would
go if we used Crimmins’ argument as a template (parallel considerations apply
to Heck and Loar’s arguments).
Suppose I assert ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’ at time t∗ and at a later time t,
and consider the beliefs b∗ and b1 that my utterances respectively express. Are
they the same belief ? Assume there is some individuation criterion on which
they are; in Crimmins’ terminology, assume there is a ‘basis’ to identify the
two beliefs. Now, at t I might be in a Frege case: I believe there are two books
called ‘the Treatise’ and I take Hume to have written both of them. I will then
have a belief b2 distinct from b1 that I would also express by ‘Hume wrote the
Treatise’. But we specified nothing about b1 that could not be true of both b1/b2.
Therefore, our individuation criterion will entail that b1 = b2. Whatever basis
we have for identifying b∗/b1, we must also identify b1/b2 on the same basis.
And since b1/b2 are distinct, it follows that there is no basis (i.e., no correct
individuation criterion) to identify b∗/b1. But Publicity requires the identity of
b∗/b1. So Publicity is false.
This argument and Crimmins’ original argument fail for parallel reasons.
First, note that we must describe the case so that b1 is based on my memory
of the previously acquired information. If there is no memory link between
b∗/b1, then it simply does not follow from Publicity that the two beliefs are
the same. Here is one possible way to describe the case more fully.43 At t∗ I
see Hume signing copies of the Treatise and form belief b∗. At the later time t,
I remember this information and assert ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’. I thereby
43 Here I am indebted to Recanati’s (2015) illuminating analysis of a similar case.
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express b1; since this belief is based on memory, by Publicity it must be the
same as b∗. At the same time t someone tells me, ‘Hume wrote another book,
also called the Treatise’. I believe her and form belief b2, which I would also
express with utterances of ‘Hume wrote the Treatise’.
We can now see where the argument goes wrong—b∗/b1 are related in a
way in which b1/b2 and b2/b∗ are not. If required to spell out this relation, it
would be natural to do so by appealing to linking, although, again, alternative
analyses are compatible with my strategy. Start with the two beliefs I hold at
the later time t, the one based on memory (b1) and the one based on testimony
(b2). These beliefs are unlinked, since I do not take them to be about the same
book. b2 is also unlinked with my previous belief b∗. By hypothesis, I think
my interlocutor is not talking about the book Hume was signing, so I take the
belief based on testimony to be about a different object. On the contrary, b1/b∗
are linked: when I remember the information that Hume wrote the Treatise, I
know I am thinking about the same book again, the book Hume was signing.
Given these linking relations, then, it is not true that ‘we specified nothing
about b1 that could not be true of both b1 and b2’—b1 is linked with b∗, while
b2 is not. So the intrapersonal version of Crimmins’ argument fails. According
to the linking criterion, b1 = b∗, satisfying Publicity, while b2 = b1/b∗, satisfying
FC. Once again, Publicity and FC are perfectly compatible if we adopt the
linking criterion.
VIII. INDIVIDUATING THOUGHTS
My response to Crimmins, Heck and Loar is based on the following individ-
uation criterion: two thoughts are the same just in case they are linked—that
is, just in case their thinkers know that the thoughts corefer. As I noted, one
motivation for the criterion is that it satisfies both Publicity and FC in the
above cases. But the criterion enjoys independent support. Consider a famous
case by Loar:
Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television
is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in that latter role, they
have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stockbroker’, intending to refer to the man
on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as
it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on television is the
man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. (Loar 1976: 357)
Smith and Jones clearly do not communicate successfully. Why is that? The
natural hypothesis is that the two subjects truly believe, but do not know that
their respective utterances corefer.44 Perhaps they are not justified in thinking
44 Heck (1995) defends the same hypothesis about an analogous case involving proper names
(ibid.: 95) and argues that communication requires knowledge of coreference—that is, more than
mere true belief in coreference (ibid.: Sections V–VIII). However, as we have seen, Heck (2002)
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that they corefer; perhaps they are justified but lucky, thus finding themselves
in a Gettier-type case. Whatever the correct diagnosis, they clearly do not
know that they are referring to the same person. So imposing a knowledge
requirement on thought identity correctly predicts and explains why Smith
and Jones fail to communicate: communication requires thought identity, and
thought identity requires knowledge of, not mere true belief in, coreference.45
As Dickie and Rattan (2010) note, various mechanisms can sustain knowledge
of coreference—in the above cases, our subjects know that they corefer in
virtue of joint attention (Sections IV andV), deference (Section VI) or memory
(Section VII).
I will now provide a first-pass formulation of the linking criterion. Let a
thought ascribe property F to object a just in case the truth of the thought
depends on whether a instantiates F.46 And let us (for now) define the linking
relation as that relation L such that two thoughts ta/tb stand in L iff the thinker(s)
of ta and the thinker(s) of tb know that ta/tb ascribe the same property to the
same object. Then:
(IC, first-pass): A thought ta is the same thought as a thought tb iff ta/tb stand in L
This criterion has two important features: it is relational and two-level. The
criterion is relational since thought identity is defined in terms of the linking
relation holding between thoughts. Moving to the second important feature,
Noonan and Curtis (2017) describe two-level criteria as follows: ‘The objects
for which the criterion is given are distinct from, and can be pictured as at
a higher level than, the objects between which the relation specified holds’.
According to IC, two thoughts are linked because their thinkers stand in a
certain mutual knowledge relation, the relation in which certain subjects stand
just in case they know that their respective thoughts ascribe the same property
to the same object. So IC is two-level—the identity conditions for thoughts
are defined in terms of linking, which is in turn defined in terms of the mutual
knowledge relation holding between thinkers.
denies that communication requires thought identity. Therefore, Heck would presumably also
reject my appeal to thought identity in accounting for Loar’s case (see below).
45 In a passage quoted by Heck (2002: 22), Frege holds that knowledge of coreference is
required for thought identity, and therefore for communication. Discussing a case in which two
subjects associate different senses with a name, Frege writes: ‘Then as far as the proper name “Dr.
Gustav Lauben” is concerned, Herbert Garner and Leo Peter do not speak the same language,
since, although they do in fact refer to the same man with this name, they do not know that they
do so. Therefore Herbert Garner does not associate the same thought with the sentence “Dr.
Gustav Lauben has been wounded” as Leo Peter wants to express with it’ (Frege 1918: 297).
46 To remain neutral between structured and unstructured accounts of thought (see Section
II), I prefer not to use the notion of the Russellian proposition expressed by a thought. Also, note that
I will focus on simple predicative thoughts, i.e., thoughts that would be expressed by utterances
of the form ‘a is F’.
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Two-level criteria are not unusual. To give just one example, Frege (1884)
famously discusses the following identity criterion for directions47:
The direction of line a = the direction of line b iff a is parallel to b
Here, the identity conditions for directions are defined in terms of the paral-
lelism relation between lines. Similarly, our criterion defines identity conditions
for thoughts in terms of the mutual knowledge relation between thinkers.
IC does not require ordinary thinkers to be theoretically sophisticated.48
Under appropriate conditions a normal subject will say things like, ‘The
speaker is thinking about the same thing as me’. So, even though the sub-
ject might not use the notion of coreference, she does believe that the speaker’s
thought corefers with hers. As theorists, we can describe a cognitive state in
terms that are not available to the owner of that state.
In imposing epistemic conditions on thought identity I follow other rela-
tional theorists like Schroeter (2012), Schroeter and Schroeter (2014) andDickie
and Rattan (2010);49 furthermore, my account has elements in common with
Cumming’s (2013) non-epistemic relational criterion. The main difference be-
tween these relational proposals and mine is that their conditions on thought
identity are too demanding, as I will now briefly argue.
According to Schroeter, two utterances express the same meaning just in
case they appear to the speakers to be de jure coreferential—that is, just in
case it is obvious, incontrovertible and epistemically primitive that they core-
fer (Schroeter 2012: sect. 1). This criterion might be adequate in the case
of a single subject interpreting her own speech or thought: in this case, the
epistemic conditions for de jure sameness are often satisfied. However, those
conditions are too strong when applied to communication. It is rarely obvi-
ous, incontrovertible and epistemically primitive that my utterance corefers
with yours. As Schroeter herself notes (ibid.: sect. 2), the appearance of de jure
sameness can be mistaken. A sufficient amount of contrary evidence can show
that, despite initial appearances, you and I were really talking past each other.
So the incontrovertibility criterion is too strong. Furthermore, a judgement
of coreference is often based on complex background information about the
context (speaker/hearer intentions, beliefs and so on). Thus, that judgement
is often neither obvious nor epistemically primitive either. In sum, Schroeter’s
conditions are so strong that they make it very difficult for ordinary speakers
to express the same meaning.
Dickie and Rattan (2010) hold (simplifying considerably) that my utterance
‘a is F’ and your utterance ‘b is G’ express the same thought just in case we
can both infer ‘Something is F and G’ immediately, i.e., without adding the
47 See Zalta (2017), Noonan and Curtis (2017) and Linnebo (2009).
48 Here I disagree with Cumming (2013).
49 My criterion also follows Prosser (unpublished manuscript).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pq/pqx062/4762114
by guest
on 17 January 2018
18 ANDREA ONOFRI
identity premise ‘a is b’ to our respective inferences. Clearly, this criterion can
only be accepted if there are rational inferences that do not require an explicit
identity premise, which is not uncontroversial.50 For instance, it might be that
all rational inferences of this form require the following implicit metalinguistic
premise: ‘The referent of “a” = the referent of “b”’. My criterion is not
committed to Dickie and Rattan’s controversial assumption concerning the
possibility of immediate inferences in communication.
Cumming (2013) holds that two mental symbols have the same content just
in case they are coordinated (ibid.: 13), where
The conventions in context C de facto coordinate a pair x, y iff, [...]
(a) There is a strategic path between x and y,
(b) x is the only symbol in agent(x)’s lexicon connected by strategic path to y, and
(c) y is the only symbol in agent(y)’s lexicon connected by strategic path to x. (Cum-
ming 2013: 9–10)
There is a strategic path between two symbols just in case (simplifying con-
siderably) their thinkers have adopted a convention of using those symbols for
the same object.
In some cases coordination is ruled out, so the two symbols do not have the
same content and communication is unsuccessful:
[...] suppose Peter has two symbols, P1 and P2, referring to Paderewski, where Speaker
has one. This would be true, for instance, were Speaker unaware that Peter thought
there were two Paderewskis. [...] In this case, Speaker simply doesn’t have the required
number of symbols to line up one-to-one with each of Peter’s [...] (ibid.: p. 11 and fn. 37)
Cumming’s conditions on successful communication are too strict. Consider
any name with multiple bearers, e.g. ‘John Smith’. Suppose I do not know how
many John Smiths you think there are. According to Cumming, my symbols
will then be uncoordinated with yours and my attempt to communicate with
you will fail. Since this situation is extremely common, Cumming predicts the
failure of most exchanges involving names with multiple bearers. This is not a
problem for my account, which does not require the speaker to have the same
number of symbols as the hearer: on my view, even if I do not know your views
about the number of John Smiths, we entertain the same thought if context
allows us to know which John Smith is under discussion. Indeed, we saw this
disambiguation mechanism at play in the cases from Sections IV and V.
Despite its advantages over rival accounts, IC is inadequate as it stands. If
thought identity is to be analysed in terms of the linking relation L, then the
latter must be an equivalence relation. Since by definition L requires mutual
knowledge in the relevant thinkers, the relation is indeed symmetric. However,
reflexivity poses a problem. Suppose Lois and Clark are communicating, so
50 For discussion, see Campbell (1987), Sainsbury (2002) and Recanati (2012).
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that by Publicity they entertain the same thought. Still, Lois might not accept
‘The thought Superman is expressing corefers with mine’, even though her
interlocutor is Superman. So Lois’ thought = Superman’s thought, but Lois
does not know that Superman’s thought corefers with hers. So the thought
seems unlinked to itself.
This problem arises because our epistemic criterion IC embeds a
propositional-attitude-ascription in its right-hand side. A full solution would
require at least sketching a theory of ascriptions, something beyond the scope
of this paper. Here, it will suffice to qualify our definition of L: two thoughts
ta/tb stand in L iff the thinker(s) of ta and the thinker(s) of tb know in the way
required by the conversation that ta/tb ascribe the same property to the same object.
Clearly, the conversation does require Lois to accept ‘The thoughtmy interlocutor
expresses corefers withmine’, but not ‘The thought Superman expresses corefers
with mine’. So the thought expressed in the exchange does bear the (qualified)
relation L to itself. A similar strategy should be applied to intrapersonal cases
of the same kind, but I must leave this discussion to another occasion.
Another problem with L is that it is not transitive. Consider A, B and C: B
knows that Superman = Clark and that Superman = Kal-El, A only knows
that Superman = Clark, C only knows that Superman = Kal-El.51 Suppose
that A tells B ‘Superman is Clark’ and their respective thoughts are linked, and
suppose that C tells B ‘Superman is Kal-El’ and their respective thoughts are
linked. Clearly, it does not follow that A and C’s thoughts are linked—neither
A nor C knows that the other subject’s thought corefers with her own thought.
So L is not transitive.
In response I will develop a suggestion by Schroeter (2012), combining it
with a classic move made by ‘psychological continuity’ theories of personal
identity52—I will analyse thought identity through a chain of overlapping
linking relations.53 Consider the ancestral of L, the indirect linking relation L*: two
thoughts ta/tb stand in L* iff there is an ordered set < ta, . . . , tn, tb > such that
each member stands in L to its successor. We can then hold that ta = tb iff they
stand in L*. Less formally, two thoughts are the same not only when directly
linked, but also when indirectly linked by a chain of direct linking relations.
SinceL* is transitive, this solves the above problem—AandC’s thoughts are the
same because they stand in the indirect linking relation L*. More generally,
this solution has the desirable result [pointed out by Schroeter (2012)] that
thoughts are widely shared by chains of communicating agents within and
across linguistic communities, as well as chains of time slices connected by
memory relations.
51 Thanks toMichaelWallner for suggesting an analogous case. See also Prosser (unpublished
manuscript) for a similar case.
52 See Perry (1975) and Olson (2017). For a different solution see Dickie and Rattan (2010:
149–50).
53 The move is also inspired by Kripke’s (1972/1980) causal-historical account of reference.
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Assuming the modifications above, then, the following is a more adequate
version of IC:
(IC): A thought ta is the same thought as a thought tb iff ta/tb stand in L*
Several issues remain open. For instance, (IC) is committed to Strawson’s
(1974) ‘merging’ model, on which someone who knows the relevant identity
will express the same thought with ‘Hesperus is bright’ and ‘Phosphorus is
bright’. Since many have rejected that model,54 this issue appears particu-
larly urgent. A more complete theory will also accomplish the following: give
different conditions for diachronic and synchronic identity; clarify the role of
thought identity in accounting for behaviour and agreement/disagreement;
explain how epistemic criteria can be non-circular even though they involve
intentional notions on both sides of the biconditional; and address issues like
the transparency of thought, reference determination and empty names. This
non-exhaustive list should make clear that this project cannot be pursued in
a single paper. My goal was more modest—I hope to have shown that a re-
lational approach has the potential to satisfy both Publicity and FC, and that
the linking account constitutes a promising version of such an approach.55
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